Full Assessment, public hearings, adequate participant funding, and an integrated panel are all required.

Full Assessment, public hearings, adequate participant funding, and an integrated panel are all required. (Submitted Feb. 3, 2026)

1. Summary

These comments are in response to the Initial Project Description (IPD) for the Deep Geological Repository (DGR) for Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel Project.

The fact that the Impact Assessments Agency of Canada has promptly posted the comments of others has been helpful for this writer, and comments of others are referred to herein.

As highlighted in the submissions of Fitzpatrick and Sinclair (Ref. No. 165) a DGR for high-level radioactive waste has never been tested. Some countries are in the process of reviewing license applications for potential facilities, but to date there are no operational facilities, and the supporting technologies have not been tested. Key project components are still in the design and development stage. An earlier effort by The Agency to assess a DGR was terminated at the request of the proponent. There is absolutely no best practice concept – no proven safe approach. This is exactly the sort of situation that requires very careful forward-looking consideration for which Impact Assessment was intended; it is, in fact, a post-child for a rigorous, transparent review.

In short, the risk of an untested, potentially highly dangerous project dictate that this project requires a full assessment, including public hearings with funding to enable meaningful public participation. This project should be referred to an integrated panel review in accordance with s. 43 of the Impact Assessment Act.

1. Voluminous materials and short timeframe

It should be noted that this writer is making this submission in their capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the review of the project materials, comments, and other research all must be done in one’s spare time outside of other work, family, and other commitments. The full draft Initial Project Description (IPD 164317E) is 1233 pages, including appendices. The draft Summary Project Description (SPD 164318E) is 92 pages. This author has made an earnest attempt to review the materials as fully as possible, but with at most 30 days to comment (practically less) it is essentially impossible for the private citizen to do a full review.

1. Transportation should not be excluded from the assessment

The proponent’s assertion that “[t]he transportation of nuclear materials (i.e., used nuclear fuel) and non-nuclear materials within established transportation corridors is not considered and (sic.) incidental activity to the Project,” (IPD 164317E, 9.3, pg. 50) is illogical.

Not including “the transportation of used fuel from reactor sites to the Project beyond the primary and secondary access roads at the Project site, as this is regulated separately under CNSC [Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission] certification and uses existing transportation infrastructure” (IPD 164317E, 9.3, pg. 51) is similarly illogical.

The transportation of the used nuclear fuel to the DGR is integral to this project. This project is not viable without the transport of used nuclear fuel to the site. The very concept of the DGR requires the movement of used nuclear fuel, from elsewhere, to the DGR site for the long-term storage.

Impacts on traffic need to be assessed. This includes assessing the risk of an accident resulting in nuclear contamination along the route, but it also includes the impacts increased traffic demand from increased economic activity that is likely to lead to road wear and traffic fatalities.   

But the IPD only considers transportation-related activities “specific to traffic and transportation of materials along the access roads, site roads and rail spur.”  (IPD 164317E, 9.3, pg. 51) This is wholly inadequate.

It is also not in line with the one-project one-review concept. The separately required certifications should all be assessed as part of a single contiguous integrated assessment process. This integrated assessment needs to include all approvals, including those under the Impact Assessment Act (IAA) and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA).

As Manitoba Energy Justice Coalition – No Nukes MB Campaign highlights (Ref. No. 112):

 “Regardless whether or not CNSC licenses nuclear transportation in Canada, the public deserves the opportunity to provide feedback about the unprecedented volumes of high level waste that will pass on a daily basis along the extensive transportation route to the proposed site. In addition, CNSC regulates many other aspects of this proposed project that have NOT been excluded from the scope that NWMO is suggesting. If transport is by road, it must traverse some of the most hazardous routes in the country (eg. Highways 11 and 17 in Ontario), well known for an increasing number of fatal accidents involving large transport trucks.  These northern routes are often closed due to weather conditions. NWMO attempts to take road closures into consideration by reducing the number of days that waste will be transported, however, it is often impossible to predict when and where closures will occur, and when they do, trucks carrying radioactive materials will be forced to stop, either at rest stops or along the highway itself, raising questions about the dose impacts to drivers of the vehicles who will not be able to switch out when their exposure limit is reached.

These routes pass through the territories of Indigenous Nations who have the constitutional and legal right to consent or object to the daily transport of radioactive and hazardous materials. They also pass through many small communities, often metres from dwellings and buildings such as schools. Non-indigenous communities along the transportation routes must be afforded the opportunity to participate in the assessment and comment on this project. Without that, this project cannot be said to have gained the social license that is required for it to proceed”

As noted by Fitzpatrick and Sinclair (Jan 27, 2026, Ref. No. 165) there is a “high potential for the facility to encourage the development of new nuclear reactors and to receive waste from existing facilities in other jurisdictions. (…) planned nuclear development in Alberta will look to this facility.

The likelihood of this is further supporter by the IPD, which notes Alberta has demonstrated an interest in nuclear development (IPD 164317E, table 4.2, pg. 37).

If Alberta’s used nuclear fuel will be stored at the proposed DGR site that will necessitate travel through Albert, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario.

Assessing the project requires considering how the used fuel is going to get to the DGR, and this requires understanding from where the used nuclear fuel will come and what routes it will travel.

Understanding this is key to understanding impacts, and in identifying the appropriate study area. 

1. A broader study area is required

The proponent assertion that the project “will not result in changes to the natural, biophysical or human environment outside of Ontario” (IPD 164317E, 20, pg. 250). The proponent’s basis of its assertion is that the Project is located more than 210 km from the Ontario-Manitoba border, and 140 km from the Ontario-United States border (Ibid.), but there are several pathways in which impacts could travel several hundred kilometres.

U.S. lawmakers have passed resolutions opposing the proposed DGR project and raised these concerns with the International Joint Commission (IJC) established under the Boundary water Treaty, 1909. This is an indication of concerns that the impacts extend beyond 140 km and have the potential to impact the entire Great Lakes Basin ((IPD 164317E, table 4.2, pg. 33). It also seems worth highlighting that even in the current political climate of the United States (where bi-partisan agreement is hard to come by) there is a bi-partisan coalition of 14 members of Congress coming together to raise concerns regarding this project (Alvin (AJ) Jones, Nov. 21, 2024, “Congressional leaders push to stop Great Lakes basin nuclear waste plan,” WCMU Public Media. Online: https://radio.wcmu.org/2024-11-21/congressional-leaders-push-to-stop-great-lakes-basin-nuclear-waste-plan). The draft IPD mentions these resolutions, but it does nothing to respond to underlying concerns.  

This writer is a resident of Manitoba and has concerns about the impact that this project will have on Manitoba, including impacts on the Lake Winnipeg Watershed. As Manitoba Energy Justice Coalition – No Nukes MB Campaign highlights (Ref. No. 112): “The proposed site is on watersheds that drain into Hudson Bay, via Lake of the Woods, the Winnipeg River and Lake Winnipeg. Any release of radioactive contamination into water, such as from the interface between ground and surface waters, or from the above ground operations of the Used Fuel Processing Plant, or from movement of nuclear materials around the site, or an accident that may occur on the site, could result in radioactive releases into the watersheds. The same is true of any airborne radioactive contamination which can travel with the wind into Manitoba or the United States. Many Manitobans spend time and travel back and forth to NW Ontario for business and leisure. Many also are property owners around the proposed site. Manitobans therefore have a direct and local interest in this project.” The draft IPD does not consider these impacts. It totally excludes impacts outside of Ontario.

This writer can also foresee impacts on Manitoba through the risk of radioactive or other contamination impacting wildlife, that may move across provincial boundaries, and the potential for bioaccumulation through predator-prey relationships which could also facilitate movement across provincial boundaries.  The draft IPD also does not consider these impacts.

These impacts also need to be considered with respect to impacts fish and migratory birds, and the corresponding obligations under the Fisheries Act and Migratory Birds Convention Act and regulations promulgated thereunder (which are federal responsibilities).

Fitzpatrick and Sinclair (Jan 27, 2026, Ref. No. 165) highlight that “[t]here will be releases from the facility into the air even if there is not a failure or accident and it has in no way been shown in the IPD that these releases do not pose a significant risk. These will occur through air exchange from the underground facility and the consolidation of the waste for shipment at the used fuel package plant (UFPP). The establishment, operation and associated releases from the UFPP are in no way sufficiently described in the IPD. The outcomes of a large release would of course be highly consequential and response to such an event has not been adequately established in the IPD.”

As noted above there seems a strong likelihood that this project could lead to used nuclear fuel travelling through Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario if the DGR, but the proponent is attempting to dodge addressing this potential impact by excluding transportation.

The proposed study area is therefore inadequate in considering all the potential impacts and needs to be expanded accordingly.

1. Indefinite active monitoring for thousands of years is required

The draft IPD indicates that “the Project is expected to last over 160 years, including site preparation, construction, operation (about 50 years), closure, and post-closure monitoring. The Project would be Licenced by the CNSC for approximately 160 years, from site preparation through decommissioning and closure,” (IPD 1643717E, 10, pg. 73).

Extended monitoring for only 100 years from 2093 to 2192 (IPD 1643717E, 11, pg. 75) is woefully inadequate.

The plan is to decommission by sealing all underground access tunnels and shafts would be backfilled and sealed. “Closure activities include removal of monitoring instruments and returning the site to greenfield conditions.” (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.4, pg. 85).

Used nuclear fuel is radioactive for thousands of years, if not indefinitely. Monitoring likewise needs to be ongoing for an indefinite period – monitoring should continue until the used fuel is no longer radioactive.

Of the three alternatives canvassed in the draft IPD, the proponent claims it has chosen a fourth option: “adaptive phased management (APM)” but this is just a modified version of option 1, deep geological disposal in the Canadian Shield (DGR) as according to the proponent APM seems to favour DGR.

“This approach [APM] also clearly identifies the technology associated with a deep geological repository as the appropriate end point. It does not rely on human institutions and active management for its safe performance over the long term (IPD 1643717E, 12.1.2.2, pp. 87-88).

The lack of human institutions and active management is drawback not a benefit. The proponent likely favours this approach for cost saving reasons, but the desire to save costs should not override safety. Active management and monitoring ensure that issues can be addressed should they arise. It ensures that there is a schedule for periodic inspection, maintenance, and refurbishment.

Essentially burying the problem, and walking away without any ongoing monitoring or active human management, heightens the risk that the existence of the project could be forgotten to humanity due to a break-down of institutional knowledge from societal change or collapse. Given the long-life of the radioactive material, this needs to be considered.

This is why option 2: storage at nuclear reactor sites seems to be the most preferred option of the options presented. It ensures there is continuous active management and complete refurbishment of the facilities every 300 years (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.2, pp. 79-80).

Storage at nuclear reactor sites eliminates the need for offsite transportation of used fuel, which eliminates risks related to offsite transportation.

It is also more equitable.  As AFN highlights in their comments (Ref. No. 97 at pg. 10): “[w]hile both northern and southern Ontario benefit from nuclear power, the southern regions—where nuclear energy production primarily occurs—receive a disproportionately larger share of these benefits. In contrast, northern regions bear the risks associated with the storage and transportation of nuclear waste but receive far less in return. This imbalance is viewed as unfair and unjust, exacerbating existing disparities and prompting calls for a more equitable distribution of both benefits and risks.”

Although this author believes that long term storage should be in situ, even the third option presented: centralized storage above or below ground is preferrable to the DGR. Option 3 like option 2, it involves continuous active management and refurbishment every 300 years.

 Both option 2 and option 3 offer faster timelines to long-term storage. The facilities for Option 2, storage at reactor sites would have been complete by 2016 to 2020 had it been pursued in 2006 (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.2, pg. 80).  The facilities for option 3, a centralized facility, would have been ready by 2023 had it been pursued in 2006 (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.3, pg. 82). The DGR option is slowest way to get used fuel into long-term storage with facilities not being ready until 2035, at the earliest (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.1, pg. 78). 

Options 2 and 3 are also preferable in that they both allow for safe retrieval of the used nuclear fuel if the storage systems did not operate as expected (or if humanity subsequently invents a better way to manage used nuclear fuel). In contrast, the technology for retrieval of used nuclear fuel from a DGR once sealed would still need to be developed (IPD 1643717E, Table 12.1, pg. 78).  It is unclear how one would address unexpected operations, if the used fuel is sealed with no easy way to retrieve it.

In short, the proponent has chosen the worst option of the three options presented in the draft IPD, and as Fitzpatrick and Sinclair highlight in their comments (Ref. No. 165) there is an “almost complete lack of consideration of reasonable alternatives in the IPD.”    

This author likewise supports the recommendation of AFN that the proponent needs to “publish a transparent document outlining alternative methods for nuclear waste storage that were considered, along with detailed information and evidence explaining why each alternative method was ruled out.” (Ref. No. 97 at pg. 18).

1. Impacts on Indigenous Peoples and Rights

As the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) highlight in their comments (Ref. No. 97) “[o]btaining Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) from all impacted First Nations is imperative. FPIC is not only vital for upholding First Nation rights and sovereignty but also for building trust, securing long-term cooperation, and preventing potential conflicts. Without FPIC, any decisions regarding the repository would lack legitimacy and could result in significant social, environmental, and legal challenges (pg. 12). Adding: “[t]he legal and ethical implications of storing nuclear waste without First Nations’ permission are profound, necessitating adherence to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)” (pg. 8).

AFN estimates that the DGR is projected to affect at least 210 First Nations communities depending on location and routes selected (pg. 12).

Before commenting further, it is important to highlight that this writer is a settler Canadian, not an Indigenous rights holder. In no way are these comments intended to speak for Indigenous peoples or Nations. However, this author has nearly fifteen years experience (over 3 years as a research consultant and 11 years as a lawyer) working with Indigenous Nations, tribal organizations and Indigenous peoples, so these comments are intended share some the knowledge that this writer has acquired through professional work.

The proponent does not seem to understand that Indigenous territories are not exclusive to a single Indigenous Nation. Indigenous territories often overlap. As Eagle Lake First Nation highlights in their comments “the Project is within the territory of Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation” but it is also in the territory of Eagle Lake First Nation (Ref No. 28)” “The IPD fails to acknowledge that the project also overlaps the Traditional Territory of Eagle Lake First Nation. If NWMO is on a reconciliation learning journey, and its work is guided by reconciliation, the IPD and NWMO's approach to the Project must be revised to recognize the impacts of the project on the rights, interests, and values of Eagle Lake First Nation,” (Ref. No. 202).

The draft IPD spends considerable time discussing the involvement of Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation, but information on other First Nations is paltry and inaccurate at times.

The draft IPD states: “The NWMO engaged on the IPD with Eagle Lake First Nation, Lac Des Mille Lac First Nation, Lac Seul First Nation, and Seine River First Nation on July 29, 2025, by sending each Nation a letter that included an update on the upcoming regulatory process for the Project and an invitation to meet and share information on the Project and to discuss next steps. A copy of each letter is provided in Appendix B. To date, there has been no formal response from any of the Nations to the letters.” (IPD 164317E, 3.1, pg. 19).

The draft IPD, however, fails to make any mention of the judicial review launched by Eagle Lake First Nation in the Federal Court of Canada (T-3606-24). Why was this omitted? This is undeniably a very formal response. 

As Eagle Lake First Nation highlight in their comments, they have requested that the impact assessment for this Project be put on hold until the legal case is resolved. Proceeding with the IA now, prejudices Eagle Lake First Nation’s case as it presuppose that the Nation will either lose its case or that our Nation will consent to the Project being in Eagle Lake First Nation territory, (Ref No. 28). This writer supports Eagle Lake First Nation in their call that this assessment should not move forward until the legal process is settled.

The draft IPD only identifies First Nations that are 107 km or less from the proposed Project.  Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation (approximately 21 km to the northwest), Eagle Lake First Nation (approximately 60 km to the northwest), Lac Des Mille Lac First Nation (approximately 64 km to the north), Lac Seul First Nation (approximately 85 km to the south), and Seine River First Nation (approximately 107 km to the southeast) (IPD 164317E, 13, pg. 96  &  3.3, pg. 22).

The draft IPD needs to acknowledge that proximity to current reserve locations is not necessarily reflective of First Nations territories. Indigenous rights holders often travel hundreds of kilometres or more to exercise their rights on the land to hunt, harvest, gather, hold ceremony, etc.  The atrocious colonial history of Canada’s past means that many First Nations were relocated hundreds of kilometres away from their traditional territories, often due illegal surrender of Indigenous lands to make way for further settlement.  Moreover, territories of Indigenous Nations often include movement to multiple locations (which might be quite far apart), but which are accessed and utilized at different times of the year based on the availability of fish, game, or plants. And the reality of ever-increasing development and the taking up of lands means Indigenous harvesters need to travel increasingly farther to exercise their rights.

In R v Green, 2022 SKCA 92 (CanLII) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled that all Indigenous people have a right to hunt on unoccupied lands in Saskatchewan, regardless of their province of residence. That case involved Indigenous hunters coming from Ontario to hunt in Saskatchewan, but the situation could easily be reversed. Indigenous hunters from Saskatchewan (Manitoba, or any other province in Canada) have the same rights to hunt on unoccupied lands in Ontario. This would include the proposed site for the DGR project, and the surrounding areas which are all Crown owned lands.

NWMO does not currently own the proposed project site. The expectation is that Ontario will subsequently transfer ownership of the Crown lands to NWMO, but no final decision has been made on timing or process yet (IPD 164317E, pg. 606).

It does not seem that the proponent has thought through the possibility of these lands being selected by any First Nation in Canada as part of their Treaty Land Entitlement. Ontario has a duty to fulfill its Treaty obligations, this means Ontario needs to meaningfully consult and accommodate where appropriate with First Nations before transferring Crown lands to third parties (Canada v. Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177 (CanLII). Albeit courts have held that this does not amount to veto power, there is still a duty to consult and accommodate that Courts will assess the adequacy of the consultation and accomodation on a case-by-case basis (Wabauskang First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources and Forestry), 2025 ONSC 316 (CanLII).

It is not clear from the draft IPD whether consultation has even been started let alone concluded. Failure to consult and accommodate could delay the proposed project if litigation ensues.  

The draft IPD completely fails to recognize legal realities with respect to Indigenous rights, and accordingly the impacts on Indigenous peoples and Nations have not been properly assessed.

1. Conclusion

This project requires a full assessment, including public hearings with funding to enable meaningful public participation. This project should be referred to an integrated panel review in accordance with s. 43 of the Impact Assessment Act.

As requested by Eagle Lake First Nation, the assessment should be put on hold until their ongoing judicial review is resolved.

Transportation needs to be included as part of the assessment, and the study area needs to be broadened to consider the impacts that this project could have on both the Great Lakes watershed basin, and the Lake Winnipeg/Hudson Bay basin. It also needs to consider this projects potential to spur further nuclear developments, in other parts of the Country.