Submission on Nuclear Waste, Small Modular Reactors, and the Deep Geological Repository in Treaty 3 Territory

The development of nuclear facilities and the long-term storage of nuclear waste raise serious concerns related to Indigenous rights, environmental protection, fiscal responsibility, and intergenerational equity. These concerns are particularly acute where proposed or potential projects intersect with Indigenous territories, including Treaty 3 lands in northwestern Ontario, where Canada’s Deep Geological Repository (DGR) for used nuclear fuel is being advanced. Any such projects must be assessed in light of Canada’s legal and moral obligations under treaties, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), including the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).¹

Canada’s nuclear waste, generated primarily by the CANDU reactor fleet, remains highly radioactive for timeframes extending hundreds of thousands of years.² While interim storage has been used to date, the federal government has endorsed a long-term strategy centred on the development of a Deep Geological Repository. The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) has described this undertaking as a multi-generational project spanning approximately 150–160 years, encompassing site selection, licensing, construction, operation, closure, and long-term monitoring.³ This timeline raises profound ethical questions regarding the transfer of risk, responsibility, and cost to future generations who derive no direct benefit from the electricity produced today.

The proposed DGR in Treaty 3 territory has heightened concerns among most First Nations regarding impacts on land, water, and cultural continuity. Treaty 3 peoples have repeatedly emphasized the centrality of water protection and stewardship responsibilities that extend across generations.⁴ The siting of permanent nuclear waste facilities in such territories underscores the necessity of Indigenous consent not as a procedural formality, but as a substantive decision-making requirement consistent with reconciliation and treaty relationships.

From an environmental and public health perspective, nuclear waste presents one of the most enduring hazards associated with energy production. Even under best-case scenarios, deep geological disposal relies on engineered and natural barriers performing as intended over geological timescales, despite uncertainty related to climate change, seismic activity, human intrusion, and institutional failure.⁵ The long-term isolation of radioactive waste cannot be guaranteed with absolute certainty, yet the consequences of failure would be irreversible.

Claims that small modular reactors (SMRs) offer a solution to nuclear waste challenges are not supported by the available evidence. Nuclear fission, regardless of reactor size or design, inevitably produces radioactive waste. A peer-reviewed study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that certain SMR designs could generate up to 5.5 times more high-level radioactive waste, 30 times more long-lived low- and intermediate-level waste, and 35 times more short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste per unit of electricity produced when compared with conventional reactors.⁶ Rather than reducing the nuclear waste burden, SMRs are likely to increase both the volume and complexity of materials requiring long-term isolation in facilities such as the DGR.

Economic considerations further compound these concerns. Nuclear waste management represents a significant and enduring public liability, with costs extending far beyond the operational life of reactors. The NWMO’s program, including the DGR, will require sustained funding, regulatory oversight, and institutional stability over more than a century.³ SMRs have not demonstrated advantages in cost, construction timelines, safety, waste reduction, or proliferation risk, and are widely expected to be more expensive per unit of electricity generated.⁷ These realities raise questions about fiscal prudence and opportunity cost, particularly when lower-risk, lower-cost energy alternatives are available.

In light of these factors, further expansion of nuclear technologies—particularly SMRs—should proceed only with rigorous federal scrutiny, full transparency, demonstrable Indigenous consent, and a credible, scientifically sound, and socially legitimate plan for the permanent management of nuclear waste. Failure to address these issues risks undermining treaty relationships, reconciliation commitments, environmental protection, and intergenerational justice.

Footnotes

1. United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007); Government of Canada, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, S.C. 2021, c. 14.
2. Natural Resources Canada, Canada’s Nuclear Fuel Waste.
3. Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), Adaptive Phased Management and Canada’s Plan for the Safe, Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel (project horizon commonly described as ~150–160 years).
4. Grand Council Treaty #3, statements and submissions on nuclear waste and water protection.
5. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Deep Geological Repository Safety Case documentation.
6. MV Ramana et al., “Nuclear waste from small modular reactors,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 2022.
7. International Energy Agency and independent energy system cost analyses on SMRs and nuclear economics.