IAAC review of the NWMO Initial Project Description for the DGR at Revell site

January 26, 2026

Dear Members of the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada,

I make the following submissions in response to NWMO’s Initial Project Description of the Deep Geological Repository at Revell, issued January 5, 2026.

For the reasons outlined below:

1. I request that the Agency conduct a full Impact Assessment with a public hearing, and
2. I request that the Agency include an examination of the whole issue of waste transportation in its Assessment 

1.  Firstly, the NWMO is far too blustery in its optimism about the risks associated with the DGR and its impacts on the local economy. At page 77 of the Summary, it states that though the NWMO recognizes these are preliminary conclusions “…it has a high level of confidence that its mitigatory measures are grounded in proven practices and established regulatory standards.” This is simply not true, as the technology associated with the containment of high level radioactive fuel bundles and their enclosure deep underground is entirely new and unproven. No successful DGR exists yet in the world, though I know that Finland is in the process of approving and constructing a similar Repository. To suggest that these are proven practices and that established regulatory standards are adequate is entirely false and misleading—mere boasting about the quality of the regulatory process, which I as an informed lawyer and citizen of Canada do not find reassuring. This is why a full impact assessment of the proposed project is needed!

2. The NWMO also imagines only positive economic impacts to the non-Indigenous communities surrounding the Project; it ignores the potential negative impacts that might result from the permanent storage, operation and decommissioning of HLW at the Revell site, including harmful health outcomes for the surrounding communities, flora and fauna, as well as negative economic impacts from the “perceived” (or real) dangers associated with the DGR. At page 89 of the Summary of the IPD, the NWMO dismisses these impacts in two ways:

  (i)  its chart on the impacts of different aspects of the Project completely dismisses as non-existent the ongoing impacts of the DGR after decommissioning, and pretends there is NO risk at all associated with the ongoing and long-term existence of the DGR at the Revell site.  It would have the IAAC and the public believe that a concentrated repository of HLW will assuredly be “all safe”, free of consequences to the people and environment in the affected area; and

  (ii)  at page 89 it simply states that regulatory and follow up monitoring will be done according to CNSC regulations and Canadian Standards Association standards, hardly a plan! The NWMO affirms that the IAAC should not be concerned “should unforeseen effects arise” as “corrective measures will be taken to prevent or minimize adverse outcomes.” This can hardly be considered a mitigation plan, as it lacks any specificity and amounts to a mere assertion that the IAAC and the public can trust that they will figure out what is needed if and when it is needed!!  “Trust us to do what is needed if it is needed” is not a detailed plan and is totally not in keeping with all the regulatory frameworks which must be applied in real time to ensure that no significant harms exist. This is inconsistent, too, with their own assertion that “perceptions of potential radioactive contamination for the disposal of used nuclear fuel may result in alteration of traditional land use.”

3. In regards to assertions made by the NWMO at page 14 of the Summary, 160 years of oversight of the Project’s construction, operation and decommissioning is NOT sufficient and the NWMO overstates the CNSC’s “independent oversight” in issuing authorizations along the way “only when safety is demonstrated”: the fact is that the CNSC is a captured regulator (*see Bruce Campbell,Corporate Rules: The Real World of Business Regulation in Canada: How government regulators are failing the public interest, 2022, James Lorimer & Company*) and furthermore, the decisions of the CNSC in regards to the licencing of the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) at Chalk River issued in January 2024 which were successfully challenged which stands as proof that confidence in the “independent oversight” of the CNSC would be misplaced.  It is odd, to me, that the NWMO completely fails to mention that successful court challenges brought recently by Kebaowek First Nation and several civil society groups to the Federal Court of Canada have shown that the CNSC did not adequately consider the application of UNDRIP in reaching the conclusions it did on the consultation process with affected First Nations nor did it adequately address the site selection process and the impacts of the facility on the Species at Risk (Act—SARA).

Though the decisions have been appealed by the proponent to the Federal Court of Appeal, the outcomes are likely to proceed to the Supreme Court of Canada.  At this time, it is uncontroverted that confidence in the CNSC’s “independent oversight” is weak for First Nations, the public and concerned environmental groups. Indeed, these groups, people like myself that have followed these processes for many years with keen interest, have no reason to believe that the NWMO is adopting a more comprehensive consultation process with WLON or other affected First Nation groups than that adopted by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL). Moreover, I believe that CNL is a member of the NWMO—a large, key player of the nuclear industry, so while it continues to challenge in court the very necessity of respecting the UNDRIP in regards to the disposal of radioactive materials on unceded traditional territories the NWMO as an industry spokesperson is also suspect. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the IPD fails to even reference the existence, let alone respect the application of, UNDRIP to NWMO’s Project development efforts; this omission clearly implies that the IAAC need not take UNDRIP into consideration either.

4. As for transportation of High Level Waste (HLW) from all over Canada to the DGR, the Initial Project Description proposes to exclude it entirely, and to only include the transportation of goods on the Revell site. It would disregard the transportation to the site by characterizing the issue as an “unchanged” activity which “already” occurs on our highways and railways and one which need only be addressed by other regulatory frameworks.

The fact, though, is that HLW  is NOT yet being transported at all on the highways and railways of Canada, at least to my knowledge and that of the general public.  In fact, it is currently being stored where it is being produced, on the site of Canada’s nuclear reactors. If it is being transported, it is certainly not being transported in the volumes, numbers of trucks and rail cars, and frequency anticipated for the operation of the DGR.

5.  Communities deserve to know when HLW is passing through their territories. The impacts of a highway or railway accident of HLW fuel containers have not been assessed anywhere else, to the best of my knowledge, in any other public regulatory process, and yet the risks to the air, land, water, flora and fauna as well as the health of human beings and the economic well-being of communities where such accidents might occur are significant. It is simply not true that transportation of high level waste is independently being regulated “within existing highways and railways.”

Moreover, the safety and reliability of transporting HLW in the planned specialized containers is yet unproven: the containers have not yet even been designed! The means by which they are to be transported—the volume, containers, numbers of passages per day or week, emergency preparedness measures in place—none of this is known to any of the affected communities; all of these aspects, as well as the actual routes to be taken through different regions, are activities clearly incidental to the construction and operation of the DGR.

6.  Furthermore, the existence of other regulatory frameworks for transportation of dangerous goods is NOT a reason for the IAAC to disregard the transportation of HLW associated with the DGR. Other frameworks for the protection of Species at Risk, for instance, exist, as well as for water protection, yet these are acknowledged as frameworks which will also have to be applied to the DGR while the issues remain a legitimate part of the IAAC’s considerations. The existence of the other frameworks is not considered cause to remove them from a full assessment by the IAAC under its legislated mandate, and neither should it be the case for the transportation of these dangerous materials. ALL impacts and risks need to be identified early in this process—and through a fully comprehensive Impact Assessment process, if the DGR is to proceed with the ALERA principle properly applied, as well as to have any social acceptability along the way.

7.  At page 68, in relation to this regulatory process, the NWMO asserts that the “IAA’s preliminary actions require consideration of whether impact assessments are necessary for activities associated with the Project”: the transportation of HLW (estimated at 2500 UFB a year) is a direct and new activity associated with the Project.  The effort by NWMO to pretend otherwise is a glaring and frightening omission from the IPD—especially glaring given that up until this stage the NWMO recognized transportation as a clear associated activity in all its publications.

8.  At pages 73-74, the Summary lists some of the Potential effects of the Project and contains a statement about “any impact on Indigenous peoples, etc.” though it fails to mention which section of the Impact Assessment Act it relies on.  The Statement SHOULD speak to the changes to the environment, health, social and economic conditions on ALL affected communities from the transportation of, and risk of accidents by road or rail, along with the negative or positive consequences of those changes in transportation incidental to the creation of the DGR.   This strikes me as a flagrant and unjustified omission by the NWMO in its IPD.

9.  At page 35 of the Summary the NWMO asserts that public input has played a significant role in shaping their engagement strategies and informing the project design, planning, and considerations in the preparation of the IA and the CNSC licensing processes.  Yet the record shows that the transportation of HLW has consistently been raised as a concern by affected First Nation groups as well as all other civil society groups participating in the site selection and DGR development process! So how has this concern “informed” their project design? It is clear that the NWMO’s “consideration” and acceptance of this issue amongst those they have “heard” as being of public concern has been deliberately excluded, through negative selecting-out! This “selecting-out” has been done without explanation or justification, as it seems obvious that transportation to the DGR site is a critical element of the activities associated with the Project. It is critical, therefore, that the IAAC understand and acknowledge that the NWMO’s assertions about having “heard” the public are biased and self-serving, certainly unjustifiably selective (to meet its preference for costs savings and simplification of the approvals process?).  The IAAC cannot allow itself to be caught up in this limited, self-serving omission and argument.

10.  I would like to add another word about the fact that the NWMO’s listing of Social and Well-being factors (page 62 ff) shows that the Area already suffers higher rates of chronic diseases and mental health issues than the rest of Ontario, as well as poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment rates. This is reflective of how risky environmentally-degrading industries and projects continue to be situated close to First Nations communities, with the consequent reality that these factors are likely to be aggravated by the impacts of the Project. This reality can hardly be considered to be cause for the Project’s proceeding in the spirit of reconciliation! The reality is contrary to real reconciliation, in my view.

11.  As for species at risk, and species which will be affected by the Project: the fact that the NWMO has not actually spent any time yet identifying the flora at risk from the Project, and that fish and wildlife, though observed, have not been deemed potentially important enough to document their habitat within or surrounding the Project does not bode well for the environmental risks to these species associated with the Project.  Should this not form an immediate part of the considerations of the IAAC? Why not? Is the IAAC not at risk of repeating the same errors committed by the CNSC when it “assessed” the NSDF at Chalk River—that is, of simply asserting that the risks are not significant in the face of conflicting evidence or of not bothering to consider or even ask for evidence to be produced? It is easier to ignore the evidence when none is brought forward by the proponent.

12.  The IPD mentions that Low Level and Intermediate Level Waste will be generated at the site of the DGR but it does state how this waste will be treated, whether it will be stored on site temporarily or permanently, or whether it will be transported to the Chalk River site should the NSDF eventually proceed. Yet these are real radioactive risks, with impacts on all the elements to be assessed. This is important to the issue of transportation again, as it seems clear that radioactive waste will be both delivered to the DGR (HLW that is) and transported from the DGR (LLW and ILW) to (an)other (un)disclosed location. This too is activity associated with the Project and should form part of the IAAC’s comprehensive assessment.

I would appreciate an acknowledgement of receipt of these submissions. I look forward to hearing that the IAAC will conduct a full Impact Assessment with a public hearing
and that the Agency will include an examination of the waste transportation in its Assessment.

Yours very truly,

Denise Giroux

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